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A COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUPREME
COURT AND ITS FUNCTIONS

The University of Warsaw is to be commended for focusing attention on
the role of a supreme court, for that can be a critical component of a court system
and, more generally, critical also to the fair functioning of a democratic government (and to others, no doubt). It makes sense to start out such a conference
considering the roles a Supreme Court can play in a judicial system, and also to
approach that question with an eye to the somewhat divergent attitudes toward
the judicial role of common law and civil law systems. Those differences may
mean a lot for the role of such a court and for the organization of the Court, a topic
to be taken up by the next panel. I hope I will not trespass too much on topics to
be addressed by others in my presentation.
I will argue that questions of design and function – while important – probably are not more important than more elusive questions about institutional status and evolution, something one could refer to as “legal culture.” So we must
approach our analysis with considerable humility. Particularly here in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, where constitutional and democratic institutions
have taken root over the last quarter century, it is important to appreciate the permutations of that sort of development.
I am here as the representative of the common law approach to the function
of a Supreme Court, and will begin by cautioning that in some ways the common
law v. civil divide is not entirely informative in regard to procedure, but that it
is highly important in terms of the role of judges in “declaring” law. I will also
speak mainly about the Supreme Court of my country, for it is a distinctive institution. That said, the US situation offers an example of functions a court may have
that differs from the function of courts in many other judicial systems, and those
differences can importantly be said to relate to its role in a common law system.
At the same time, I will regard such questions as whether the Supreme Court
should have the power of judicial review of legislation as somewhat background.
In the US, as is well known, we have had such review since Marbury v. Madi-

16

Richard Marcus

son,1 but that 1803 decision did not immediately place a stamp on our Court that
remained unchanged for the ensuing 200 years.

I. DIVIDING THE WORLD INTO “COMMON LAW”
AND “CIVIL LAW” SPHERES
Below I will emphasize that a common law tradition says a lot about the function of a Supreme Court as it says a lot about the function of courts in general.
But as I’ve emphasized before,2 that divide does not stand up to close scrutiny as
a compelling clue to procedural arrangements. So I start with a caution – not all
common law countries are alike in terms of the function of their Supreme Court
– but end up affirming that there seems a significant divide in terms of the role
of judges in making law, which can be at its most important in relation to the functioning of the supreme court in such a system.
One approach to the function of a supreme court is to recognize a different
division among national judicial systems. Many report that there are two main
prototypes – the US version with diffused constitutional review, and the centralized constitutional court with an “abstract” authority to pronounce on constitutional matters but no other role in the judicial system. That oracular alternative
vision of a Supreme Court is most associated with Hans Kelsen,3 and that vision
has been cited as the model used by many European constitutional courts, not just
Austria’s. The distinction remains an organizing technique for scholars.4 To some
measure, it may correspond to the common law/civil law divide.
But neither the common law camp nor the civil law camp is monolithic. The
US has had a Supreme Court almost from the outset. The UK, on the other hand,
has formally had such a court only since 2005, less than a decade, and at least
some notable observers were quite cool to its creation.5 And the UK court is not
equipped with the powers the US Supreme Court announced in Marbury because
it cannot invalidate an Act of Parliament.6 Australia, on the other hand, has had
5 US 137 (1803).
See R. Marcus, Exceptionalism and Convergence: Form versus Content and Categorical
Views of Procedure, (in:) J. Walker, O. G. Chase (eds.), Common Law, Civil Law, and the Future
of Categories (2010), at 521.
3
See generally M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (1971).
4
See, e.g., A. Gamper, F. Palermo, The Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern Profiles of an
Archetype of Constitutional Review in Comparative Perspective, (in:) A. Harding, P. Leyland (eds.),
Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (2009), at 31.
5
See, e.g., N. Andrews, The United Kingdom’s Supreme Court: Three Skeptical Reflections Concerning the New Court, 9 “Utah Law Review” (2011).
6
Id. at 10 (“The Supreme Court lacks the power to invalidate an Act of Parliament”).
1
2
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a Supreme Court since the beginning of the 20th century, although not in a system with separation of powers comparable to the US version.7 But the Australian
court does function in a legal setup that involves somewhat independent judiciaries of various Australian states, more akin to the US situation. In short, being
a “common law” jurisdiction does not magically answer important questions
addressed in this conference.
The “civil law” jurisdictions seem, from a distance, not to be entirely uniform
either. Some, such as Austria, evidently adopted the pristine version of a constitutional court of the sort Professor Kelsen advocated. Speaking in the civil law
context, however, scholars have observed that “French constitutional review is
quite unique.”8 A majority of the members of the distinctive French court have
political backgrounds, including all former presidents of the Republic, and some
have no formal professional legal training.9 Moreover, this court “is not situated
at the summit of a hierarchy of judicial or administrative courts. In that sense it is
not a supreme court in the meaning of the Supreme Court of the US.”10
But another difference needs mention here. In many civil law jurisdictions, it
seems that the customary path to judicial office, and to rising in the judiciary, is
a careerist one separate from the path of the practising bar. The route to promotion
involves satisfying and hopefully impressing those in higher positions in the judicial hierarchy. American lawyers come to the bench in a very different way:
“Because American judges sit on courts of widely varying types and come from
a variety of backgrounds and experiences, it is difficult to generalize about them.
Two generalizations, however, are possible. First, judges in the United States initially come to the bench from other lines of legal work and after a substantial
number of years of professional experience. Second, once on the bench they do
not, generally, follow a promotional pattern through the ranks of the judiciary.
In these respects, American judges differ from judges in the common-law and
civil-law systems in other parts of the world.”11
Again, the US experience is distinct from that of common law systems elsewhere and civil law systems. In this instance, that distinctiveness might erode
the power over American judges wielded by any appellate court, including
a Supreme Court. Indeed, Professor Dalton suggested 30 years ago that the typical
American trial court judge might not care much about whether she was affirmed
or reversed.12
7
See T. Stevens, G. Williams, A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom? A View from the High
Court of Australia, 24 Legal Studies 188 (2004).
8
M-C Ponthoreau, F. Hourquebie, The French Conseil Constitutionnel: An Evolving Form
of Constitutional Justice, (in:) Harding & Leyland, supra note 4, at 81, 82.
9
Id. at 86-87.
10
Id. at 95.
11
D. Meador, American Courts 49 (2000).
12
H. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 “The Yale Law Journal”
62 (1985). See generally, R. L. Marcus, Appellate Review in the Reactive Model: The Example of the
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But an overarching distinction between the common law and the civil law
versions of the judicial role seems to outweigh all the messiness of the distinction
noted above. In civil law systems, “the role and function of the judiciary . . . were
rigidly circumscribed. The judge’s role was a subservient and bureaucratic one:
he was required to verify the existence and applicability of statutory norms to
a case at hand . . . To recognize a judge-made law in this system was to diagnose
pathology.”13
This is a key point Professor Cappelletti emphasized in his analysis of diverging attitudes toward judicial review, tracing the civil law view to the French Revolution. He pointed to “the revolutionary legislators’ profound distrust of the judges,”
which led to an effort “to prevent the judicial organs from interfering in the legislative sphere and to ensure that they apply only the letter of the law. This was
a phase in the development of the concept which soon resulted in the great French
codification, and concept that the entire body of law could and should be contained in written instruments.”14
Things were markedly different in England, Professor Cappelletti explained,
because “the English judiciary . . . generally enjoyed the respect of all as a protector of individuals,” with the result that “the English legal tradition had often
tended to assign a subordinate role to the legislative function of King and Parliament, holding that the law was not created but ascertained or declared. Common
law was fundamental law, and, although it could be complemented by the legislator, it could not be violated by him.”15 As we shall see in Part III, this difference
means that being a court in a common law system carries with it much broader
authority. A supreme court in such a system is, as a result, much more supreme.

II. THE DISTINCTIVE HISTORY OF THE US SUPREME COURT
AND THE US FEDERAL SYSTEM
It may be true, as Lord Bingham of Cornhill said in 2002, that the US
Supreme Court is “the world’s best-known supreme court.”16 But that does not
mean it was inevitable it would attain that status from the outset, or that the basic
American Federal Courts, (in:) A. Uzelac, C. H. van Rhee (eds.), Nobody’s Perfect: Comparative
Essays in Appeals and Other Means of Recourse Against Judicial Decisions in Civil Matters (2014)
at 105.
13
A. Stone, Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making, (in:) D. W. Jackson, C. Neal Tate
(eds.), Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (1992) at 41, 42.
14
Cappelletti, supra note 3, at 13.
15
Id. at 36–37.
16
Lord Bingham of Cornhill, A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, The Constitution
Unit 12–13 (May 1, 2002), quoted in M. Fennell, Emergent Identity. A Comparative Analysis of the
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structure set up at the outset made the current reality likely. Although some 21st
century scholars have concluded that “a constitutional court’s success or failure
depends as much on legal design as on the political culture in which a court operates,”17 the American experience provides considerable reason to credit political
culture for the present eminence of the American court. As a starting point, it is
worth emphasizing again that this does not seem a particularly common law – as
opposed to distinctively American – circumstance: “[T]he UK Supreme Court
will never mirror the US Supreme Court, because the new UK Supreme Court
is designed to create a more muted and less recognizable court identity than that
of the US Supreme Court.”18
Making predictions early on about how courts will turn out is risky, as a 2011
book by Professor Crowe, a political scientist, on the evolution of the US Court
emphasizes. Thus, he begins with the “sorry scene” when the US Supreme Court
first convened in New York City in 1790; only four of the six justices even bothered to show up, and the Court had no cases to decide.19 “With several distinguished men having refused appointment and the docket languishing without any
substantial business, the Court of the late eighteenth century was a feeble institution.”20 Perhaps mighty oaks will grow from tiny acorns, but there is no guarantee
that will happen.
This reality might not entirely have surprised the Framers of the US Constitution, who were decidedly ambivalent, or perhaps a better word is divided, on
the proper role for the federal judiciary in general. Although the US Constitution
did create a Supreme Court, it did not create any other federal courts, leaving
that to Congress. That ambivalent feature of the judiciary article of the Constitution resulted from a profound disagreement between the Jeffersonians, who
favoured state governments, and the Federalists, who emphasized national governmental powers. The Jeffersonians resisted the idea of a cadre of federal judges
across the land who owed primary allegiance to the national government and
not the state in which they sat. The first Congress nonetheless created a lower
federal court system and gave the Supreme Court authority to review the decisions of those federal courts as well as the decisions of state courts when those
decisions involved issues of federal law. The seeds for federal judicial power were
therefore planted early.
The early debate between the Federalists and the Jeffersonians reflected
a divide that has not vanished, and also bears on the structure of the American
New Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 “Temple
International and Comparative Law Journal” 279, 297 (2008).
17
K. Lach, W. Sadurski, Constitutional Courts of Central and Eastern Europe: Between Adolescence and Maturity, (in:) Harding & Leyland, supra note 4, at 52, 57.
18
Fennell, supra note 15, at 305.
19
J. Crowe, Building the Judiciary 1 (2011).
20
Id. at 2.
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court system, or better perhaps to say systems (including the state courts).
At first,there was little federal statutory law, but much judge-made common law.
That law was shaped by state courts and, after their creation, also by federal
courts. But the US Supreme Court never had authority review that common law
decisions of state supreme courts unless there was a claim the state court decision
violated some provision of federal law. But when federal courts made common
law decisions, as we shall see, they felt free until the 1930s to disregard state court
decisions.
Over the last 200 years the prominence of American federal law has increased
dramatically. Indeed, 50 years ago it seemed that the balance of law-making
power had shifted so far that Jeffersonian localism was dead. But in reality localism has not died, and it has enjoyed something of a resurgence in recent decades.
As a result, in the US there is not just one Supreme Court. Instead, each of the
50 states has a supreme court that is the supreme arbiter of the law of that state.
This circumstance is surely not an inevitable feature of a common law system.
Indeed, it may not be true of many others. It is surely not true of England and
Wales,21 and in Canada the national supreme court is the ultimate arbiter of most
legal questions, not the provincial courts.22 At the same time, there may be civil
law systems in countries that emphasize localism – Switzerland comes to mind
as a possible example.
But those seeds depended on more than the structural question whether to
have a Supreme Court and whether to have lower federal courts. The American
political soil may have been particularly susceptible to growing independent and
powerful judicial institutions. As de Tocqueville observed in the 1830s: “I do
not think that, until now, any nation in the world has constituted judicial power
in the same manner as the Americans.”23 In such a system of government, judges
are likely to wield substantial power.
That power links up with the common law system because judges are not
entirely beholden to the legislature to make law, and it empowers appellate courts
in general and Supreme Courts in particular because the common law notion
of precedent makes their decisions farther reaching than a civil law court’s ruling
an a single case. But another factor is the selection process that produces judges
with significant backgrounds and only a weak sense of belonging to a bureaucratic judicial institution. Professor Kagan has graphically described this distinc21
Consider the views offered in 2006 by The Economist: “Power in Britain has long been more
centralized than in America or other European countries, but it has become more so in the past
50years.” A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Council, The Economist, Feb. 25, 2006, at 60.
22
See P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada (4th ed. 229–33 2002). See also infra text at
note 62 for a contrast between the Canadian and US approach to common law powers of the federal
supreme court and lower federal courts.
23
A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 93, H. C. Mansfield, D. Winthrop translation, University of Chicago Press (2000) (originally published in 1835).
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tive feature: “Compared to most national judiciaries, American judges are less
constrained by legal formalisms; they are more policy-oriented, more attentive
to the equities (and inequities) of the particular situation. In the decentralized
American legal system, if one judge closes the door on a novel legal argument,
claimants can often find a more receptive judge in another court.”24
This feature may also tend to weaken the appellate courts’ (and therefore
Supreme Court’s) control over judicial actions by lower courts. At least in the US,
that limitation on the authority of higher courts is fortified by stringent limitations on timing of appellate review and scope of appellate review. Different
from most civil law countries, in the US appellate review is allowed only after
a “final judgment” has been entered in the trial court,25 and even then is limited to
the record made in the trial court. In Continental systems, opening the record to
new arguments and even new evidence on appeal is the norm, but not in America.
So appellate courts are circumscribed in their ability to control what lower courts
do, and are less “supreme” as a result. Most American cases never reach a posture
(final judgment) in which an appeal can be taken, and for those cases appellate
courts in general – and Supreme Courts in particular – are ordinarily not able to
wield any power.26 If structural features are emphasized in relation to the power
of appellate courts, these must be considered among the most important.
This distinctiveness of the appellate function bears also on the question
of remedies available in the US Supreme Court in particular, and American appellate courts more generally. These courts are part of the overall US court system,
and their authority is limited to appellate review of decisions by lower courts. As
a consequence, these remedies are, in general, to affirm or reverse what the lower
court has done in the case, basing these decisions on the record and arguments
made in the lower court. The Supreme Court does not itself choose or implement
the remedy.
It appears that supreme courts elsewhere would wield broader powers and
deploy additional remedies. More than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court of India
decided that “public interest litigation in India [would be] primarily judge-led and
even to some extent judge-induced; the product of juristic and judicial activism
of our Supreme Court.”27 Recent newspaper reports in the US say, for example,
that India’s Supreme Court ordered in 1998 that all public transport in Delhi be
switched to compressed natural gas,28 and that in 2014 it ordered an investigation
R. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 16 (2001).
See, e.g., 28 USC. ‘1291.
26
In exceptional circumstances, it may be possible for an appellate court to intervene in a case
using a writ of mandamus, but this is quite exceptional. See infra text accompanying note 106.
27
P. N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 “Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law” 561, 561 (1985). The author was then a justice of the Supreme Court of India,
and about to become chief justice.
28
G. Harris, Beijing’s Bad Air Would Be A Step Up for Smoggy Delhi, “New York Times”, Jan.
26 (2014), at 6 (“In 1998, India’s Supreme Court ordered that Delhi’s taxis, three-wheelers and buses
24
25
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into charges that village elders in West Bengal ordered a gang rape of a 20-yearold woman as “punishment” for a the victim’s romantic relationship with a man
from another community.29 Similarly, in Bangladesh the High Court responded to
a petition by “activists and lawyers” by ordering an investigation into a clothing
factory fire that killed 112 employees.30
These are simply not the sorts of things that American courts, including
supreme courts, would do. The US federal courts, for example, may only decide
“cases or controversies” involving adversary parties who assert “legal” rights to
judicial relief. This contrasts with “abstract” review done by a constitutional court
in the Kelsen mode; as the leading treatise on the US federal courts explains, “[t]he
courts of the United States do not sit to decide questions of law presented in a vacuum, but only those question that arise in a ‘case or controversy’.”31 “Unconstitutional statutes there may be, but unless they are involved in a case properly
susceptible of judicial determination, the courts have no power to pronounce that
they are unconstitutional.”32 Instead, the federal courts will only decide cases
presented by litigants with “standing to sue.”33
In American federal-court litigation, then, the initiative rests with the parties,
not with the court, and only when a case is presented by genuine adversaries with
legal rights at stake may the court decide. But the breadth of judicial remedies
in American litigated cases – often called “public law” cases34 – probably outstrips what courts can do in most civil law systems, perhaps also common law
jurisdictions. American judicial remedies in such cases may command the other
branches of government to do or stop doing something even though the political
actors in those other branches of government strongly want to pursue their chosen course. Particularly tensions can result when a federal court enters such an
order against a state government. Those remedies are usually not directly granted
or administered by supreme courts, and although lower court decisions granting
such remedies are subject to appellate review that review is often under an “abuse
of discretion” standard that accords substantial latitude to the lower courts.

be converted to compressed natural gas, but the resulting improvements in air quality were short-lived
as cars flooded the roads.”).
29
High Court Orders Inquiry of Gang Rape, S.F. Chron., Jan. 25, 2014, at A4.
30
J. Ali Manik, E. Barry, Months After Deadly Fire, Owners of Bangladesh Factory Surrender
to Court, “New York Times”, Feb. 10, 2014, at A8. See also S. Shoaib Hasan, Top Court Confronts
Military on Missing Persons, “New York Times”, April 23, 2014, at A9 (reporting that “[t]he
Supreme Court is moving to prosecute military officials in civil courts for failing to produce
missing persons”).
31
Ch. A. Wright, M. K. Kane, Law of Federal Courts 61 (7th ed. 2011).
32
Id. at 62.
33
See id. ‘13.
34
The classic study of this subject is A. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 “Harvard Law Review” 1281 (1976).
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But it can hardly be said that American courts shy from employing forceful
remedies. Perhaps the most striking recent example of such “public law” remedies
is the US district court order that the State of California reduce its prison population because the level of crowding violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.”35 The district court’s injunction emerged
from years of litigation about overcrowding, and directed that the prison population be reduced by release of prisoners before their sentences were fully served,
perhaps as many as 46,000 prisoners. Professor Issacharoff has called this case
“the most significant class action litigation of the past decade.”36 Justice Scalia,
dissenting in the Supreme Court, called it “perhaps the most radical injunction
issued by a court in our Nation’s history,” an order that “ignores bedrock limitations on the power of Article III judges, and takes federal courts widely beyond
their institutional capacity.”37 He also deplored “the inevitable murders, robberies,
and rapes to be committed by the released inmates.”38 The majority, meanwhile,
concluded its opinion with an admonition to the district court to consider revising its order and to give weight to any concerns about public safety.39 But when
the district court did not change the injunction, the Supreme Court did not take up
the case again, prompting Justice Scalia to taunt the majority with the argument
that “[t]he [Court’s] bluff [regarding revision of the injunction that was subject
to an abuse of discretion standard on appeal] has been called, and the Court has
nary a pair to lay on the table.”40 This case may illustrate both the aggressiveness
of American federal courts and the limited authority the Supreme Court has to
rein them in. Perhaps the Supreme Court is not so “supreme” after all.
Though the case or controversy limitation distinguishes the American federal courts from the Kelsen model, it cannot be said to be integral to all common
law systems. By the late 18th century the power of English judges to give advisory opinions was well recognized.41 The Supreme Court of Canada similarly
may take advisory jurisdiction.42 At least some American states do allow their
supreme courts to provide Kelsen-style advance review of proposed legislation.43
The Supreme Court of India treats informal communications from citizens as
Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011).
S. Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 “Loyola University of Chicago Law Review” 369, 375 (2012).
37
131 S.Ct. at 1950–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38
Id. at 1957.
39
Id. at 1946.
40
Brown v. Plata, 134 S.Ct. 1, 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting from delay of application for a stay of enforcement of district court order).
41
Wright, Kane, supra note 31, at 66.
42
Hogg, supra note 22, at 239–41.
43
M. C. Dorf, Abstract and Concrete Review, (in:) V. Amar, M. Tushnet (eds.), Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (2009), at 3, 4 (reporting that Massachusetts permits review of the constitutionality of proposed legislation).
35

36
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sufficient to invoke its “epistolary jurisdiction,” and then eschews the adversary
method in handling such cases, sometimes appointing scholars or others to investigate underlying circumstances and report back to the court.44 And it seems that
the Indian court is at least as aggressive as American courts in using “public law”
remedies without worrying about “standing to sue.”
So the US arrangement is distinctive in ways that could enable and hobble
the Supreme Court. It could be hobbled by the case or controversy requirement if
no litigation between parties with legal rights at stake arose. It could be hobbled
by inability to intervene in proceedings in lower courts in most cases, or in time
to make a difference. It could be empowered because so much can depend on what
courts can order or reorder in American society. The American experience need
not be everyone’s experience, and might come closer to being unique.
One final point should be made before turning to specific heads of this paper.
That is to emphasize how long this American institution took to build. Professor Crowe’s recent work emphasizes the gradual and long process by which
the weakling US Supreme Court of the 18th century became the potent Supreme
Court of the 21st century. Very few governments have lasted nearly as long as
the Court (and the US government) has lasted. In Europe, for example, the only
others of similar or greater age are the UK and Switzerland. And the UK is now
confronting the possibility of secession by Scotland. Professor Crowe’s point
about the two centuries it took to build the American Supreme Court is that at
many points along the way that process depended on political judgments made by
the political branches.45 Some or most of those might have gone another way, and
if they had the US Court would likely have a different profile.
In sum, the US is distinctive and instructive because (a) it has a common law
system, in (b) a federal state (including 50 “mini” state supreme courts authorized
to pronounce common law rules), with (c) broad authority to interpret federal legislation, and (d) authority also to design and refine the procedure used in the federal courts. One more distinction should be mentioned – our Supreme Court is not
subject to review by any outside body. In the EU, the presence of the European
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights presents a very dif-

Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 572–74.
Professor Crowe examines a variety of episodes in the two centuries it took to bring American
judicial institutions to their present eminence. For those who are interested, here is a short summary:
The first episode is the adoption of the First Judiciary Act in 1789 (chp. 2); the second is the reorganization of the federal judiciary during the first half of the 19th century (chp. 3); the third is the empowerment of the judiciary by the Compromise of 1850, which admitted California to the union as a free
state and began the period leading up to the American Civil War (chp. 4); the fourth is the restructuring
of the federal judiciary between 1877 and 1913 (chp. 5); the fifth was what he calls the bureaucratization of the judiciary between 1914 and 1939 (chp. 6); and the sixth was the increased specialization
of the judicial branch between 1939 and 2000 (chp. 7).
44
45
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ferent situation.46 In the US, the Supreme Court occasionally invokes or refers
to non-American legal principles, sufficiently frequently to prompt apoplectic
objections from some members of Congress.47 But nothing can make the US
Supreme Court accept those “un-American” legal pronouncements, whether or
not Congress can forbid consideration of them.

III. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN A COMMON LAW SYSTEM
Being a Supreme Court is different in a common law system. As noted above,48
the civil law limits on judicial action have been traced to the French Revolution.
That distinction evidently endures; in France now, one begins with “the sacred
character of statute law.”49 Surely a legislature would appreciate having its statutes regarded as sacred. Surely a court system attuned to regard statutes as sacred
would be reluctant to stray far from their literal commands. And perhaps surely, it
would be attractive to such a court system to declare that judicial decisions were
simply resolutions of disputes about how the sacred statutes apply, and therefore
not precedent for later judicial decisions, which should look only to the sacred
statutes.
A common law system is different. Indeed, one could say that the very idea
of a common law system is at odds with legislative supremacy. Where exactly
did the royal judges in England who created the common law find it? Surely not
in Acts of Parliament. Instead, they looked to precedent, which obviously contained the work product of earlier generations of judges. But as one follows this
development back up the line, one is left with a troubling initial question – what is
the ultimate source of all this law? Is it simply the creation of the judges? That is
when one is tempted toward embracing some version of “natural law,” somewhat
like saying that God created the law, and judges are in a sense the priests who
have the skill and training to discern that law.
This is not just an American phenomenon. Thus, a Justice of the Supreme
Court of India explained the “activist” bent of that court in terms that would be
anathema to the makers of the French Revolution: “There is a myth strongly nurtured in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and propagated by many jurists that judges do
46
For a thoughtful analysis of some of these issues, see J. C. Cohen, The European Preliminary
Reference and US Supreme Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Federalism, 44 “American Journal of Comparative Law” 421 (1996).
47
For a contrast, see A. Lollini, The South African Constitutional Court Experience: Reasoning
Patterns Based on Foreign Law, 8 “Utrecht Law Review” 55 (2012) (exploring the use by supreme
courts, particularly the one in South Africa, of legal principles from other countries).
48
See supra text at note 14.
49
Ponthoreau & Hourquebie, supra note 8, at 82.
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not make law, that they merely interpret law. Law is there, existing and immanent,
and judges merely find it. The lawmaking function does not belong to them – it
belongs to the legislature – and judges merely reflect what the legislature has said.
This is the proclaimed theory of the judicial function, but I am afraid that it hides
the real nature of the judicial process. It has been deliberately constructed in order
to insulate judges against vulnerability to public criticism, and to preserve their
image of neutrality, which is regarded as necessary for enhancing their credibility.
It also helps judges escape accountability for what they decide, because they can
always plead helplessness (even if the law they declare is unjust) by saying that it
is the law made by the legislature and that they have no choice but to give effect
to it.”50
In such a system, being a Supreme Court means being quite supreme. For
a wide variety of important subjects, judges themselves devise, develop, and
refine the legal rules that determine the rights of other citizens. In France, this
process may have led to revolution, but in England it did not. Instead, it was
imported into America, where local courts followed the English common law tradition, and often also followed English common law cases on questions like rules
of contract law. After the American Revolution, a number of American statutes,
by statute, “received” English common law as the law of the state.
That reception of English common law left open the question what that law
became after it was “received.” Could it be changed? The English judges did
not stop refining and improving their common law at the time of the American
Revolution, or when given states decided to “receive” it as their own. Should
American states be locked into English common law that had been rejected by
the courts of England? The question answers itself, whether or not there was
a formal “reception” of English common law in a particular American state.
The answer was that the courts of the state could interpret and improve
the state common law, just as the English courts could interpret and improve
the English common law. That task was one of the things that were on the minds
of the Framers of the US Constitution when they debated creating lower federal
courts. At least some were concerned that having a phalanx of federal judges
acting in the common law manner would raise the risk that state interests, and
perhaps even state court decisions about issues of common law, would not be
recognized in federal court. Seemingly to assuage this concern, when it created
the lower federal courts in 1789 Congress included in the First Judiciary Act
Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 562–63. He also quotes Lord Reid, an English judge, as follows:
“There was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law – they only
declare it. Those with a taste for fairy tales deem to have thought that in some Aladdin’s cave there is
hidden the Common Law in all its spendour and that on a judge’s appointment there descends on him
knowledge of the magic words Open Sesame. Bad decisions are given when the judge has muddled
the password and the wrong door opens. But we do not believe in fairy tales any more.” Id. at 563
(quoting Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J.S.P.T.L. 22 (1972)).
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a provision commonly known as the Rules of Decision Act, which directs federal
judges to apply “the laws of the several states” in cases before them.51
The problem then was whether this statute applied to “state” common law
– the decisions of state courts. In 1842, the US Supreme Court ruled that this
statute52 did not apply to state court decisions: “In the ordinary use of language
it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They
are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and not themselves laws.”53 This
decision meant that federal judges were free to act as common law judges and
continue to develop rules of common law in the traditional manner of the judicial priesthood. That law would not be “federal” law (which the US Constitution
declares is the supreme law of the land), so the US Supreme Court would not be
supreme in declaring general common law. But it would be free of any outside
constraint in doing so.
In the view of many, this freedom for federal judges to shape common law
principles produced undesirable results in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.54
American Progressives found that federal judges too often interpreted this common law in ways that favoured business interests over the interests of consumers
and others.55 State court judges might modernize their states’ common law to take
account of the challenges of an industrializing society, but their efforts might be
frustrated were litigants able to get their cases into federal court, where federal
judges’ hidebound version of “common law” applied. Strong objections to this
behaviour included Justice Holmes critique that it seemed to rest on the assumption that there was “a transcendental body of law outside any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.”56 This contretemps

51
See 28 USC. ‘1652: “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”
52
Note that this is an example of statutory construction, a topic covered in Part IV. The Justices
of the Supreme Court in 1842 assumed that the members of Congress who enacted the statutory provision in issue – a part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 – shared their vision of the judicial role. But
as noted later in text, that vision was fading, as a “positivist” interpretation of law emerged in the 19th
century and supplanted a “natural law” notion that law did somehow suffuse the atmosphere.
53
Swift v. Tyson, 41 US 1, 12 (1842).
54
In terms of the issues addressed in Part VI on constitutional interpretation, it is worth noting
that during this same period the Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process clause of the Constitution
as constricting the authority of the state legislatures to enact some kinds of protective legislation. See,
e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908) (invalidating state statute that set limit of ten hours per day
for women to work).
55
For a careful examination of this development, see E. Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive
Constitution (2000) (describing the growing disenchantment of progressive Americans with the tenor
and content of federal court decisions on issues of “common law”).
56
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 US
518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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emphasizes, however, the great importance of common law judges who are not
bound to respect the legislature’s word as sacred.
These circumstances fostered a 19th century movement in the US to “codify”
all of common law that began around the same time the French were codifying
all their law,57 seeking to supplant the entirety of common law with statutory
codes.58 One important goal of this effort was rein in American common law
judges. Those judges often took a very strict attitude toward legislation, regarding
it as un unwelcome “intrusion” into the common law.59 The codification effort
continued through the 19th century; California, for example, “codified” its law
in 1872. But the common law authority of state court judges did not vanish; even
in California the “codified” common law is applied in terms of myriad judicial
interpretations, and those interpretations built originally on prior common law
precedents. Indeed, the codification legislation itself was build on a foundation
of common law precedents.
With regard to the common law powers of federal judges, however, the watershed came in 1938, when the US Supreme Court decided in the famous case Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins60 that it had been wrong in 1842 to hold that the Rules
of Decision Act excused federal judges from following and applying decisions
of state courts. Indeed, it held that this judicial behaviour violated the US Constitution: “Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether
the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”61
Even a common law country with a federal form of government might reject
this attitude. Thus, Canada permits its federal supreme court to decide common
law questions from throughout the nation, and a leading Canadian scholar had
endorsed its refusal to follow the route of the US Supreme Court: “Albert Abel
argued that the Supreme Court of Canada should follow the lead of the Supreme
Court of the United States and adopt a rule of restraint in provincial law cases
like the rule in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. He argues that such a rule would
make the law more responsive to the differing needs and sentiments of the provinces. . . [W]ith respect to the nine common law provinces it is easy to agree
with Gibson that ‘such a change would result in many more interprovincial legal
See supra text accompanying note 14.
See M. J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780–1860, pp. 16–30 (1977).
59
See id. at 253–66.
60
304 US 64 (1938).
61
Id. at 78.
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discrepancies than could be attributed to cultural differences.’ It must be remembered that whenever a province does desire a different regime of law, it is free
to enact a statute. In my opinion, the uniformity of the common law throughout Canada, while undoubtedly at variance with the ideal model of federalism,
does not really impair provincial autonomy in any practical way. Moreover,
the rule of uniformity makes Canada’s laws much less complicated than those
of the United States, and it allows the highest court (with presumably the best
judges) to apply its talents to the development of all Canada’s laws, both provincial and federal.”62 So the Supreme Court of Canada is really supreme as to
common law.
Since 1938, however, the US Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
had no authority to develop rules of law to govern the multitude of everyday matters addressed by the common law. True, as attitudes on federal power evolved
Congress was found to have broader powers to legislate on matters that had been
governed by common law, and under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause that
legislation might displace the common law. But federal judges – as common law
deciders – could not make similar decisions.63
State courts could make such decisions, however. Accordingly in the US
we have not one Supreme Court, but 50 – one for each state.64 Note that in its
1938 decision the US Supreme Court recognized the possibility that “the law
of the state shall be declared by is legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision.”65 Subject to state law, those state courts have “supreme” authority
over the content of state common law. The US Supreme Court can alter their
decisions based on that law only by concluding that some federal constitutional or
statutory reason exists for rejecting that decision.

IV. STATUTORY SUPREMACY
Perhaps American courts might be more like the French when it comes to
statutes, however. Being a “supreme” court would not be so supreme then. But
having a two-party political system and a bi-cameral legislature, plus a President
Hogg, supra note 22, at 231–32.
See T. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 “University of Chicago Law
Review” 1 (1985) (arguing that the only branch of the federal government that is restrained under this
constitutional doctrine is the judiciary, since both Congress and the Executive have broad powers to
affect legal rules across the country).
64
Technically there are also similar judicial bodies to make decisions on local law in the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and also the Virgin Islands and Guam. And one state
– Louisiana – originated as a civil law jurisdiction, so it presents a singular profile.
65
See supra text at note 61.
62

63
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with veto power, limits this constraint on the courts. As Professor Crowe noted
in his study of the growth of judicial power in the US, one strategy Congress
might employ to reach a compromise would be “drafting vague statutes in need
of judicial interpretation.”66 Even if French judges can treat their statutes as “scripture,”67 American judges sometimes cannot. More generally, it has seemed that
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have interpreted statutes broadly or
narrowly as they have found more suitable, rather than solely when Congress has
left the question to them.
Indeed, interpretation of statutes may shift over time. A prime example is
another provision in the First Judiciary Act of 1789, known as the Alien Tort
Claims Act, which says in full: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”68 It should be clear that this statute
invoked uncertain language – what is “the law of nations”? Perhaps due to that
uncertainty, it sat on the books but was not used in the courts for about 190 years,
until the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in 1980 that it could
be used for modern human rights claims.69 This possibility produced tremendous
excitement in the academic community70 and eventually led to two Supreme Court
decisions limiting the application of the Act.71 These decisions produced predications that human rights litigation would gravitate to the state courts, because
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute would bind all the federal courts.
Supreme Court interpretations of statutes are vulnerable to “reversal” by
Congress. One prominent example occurred after the US Supreme Court made
several rulings in its 1989–1990 Term that many viewed as unduly restrictive
in cases brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,72 the basic law
against employment discrimination. In 1990, Congress, dominated by the Democratic Party, passed a Civil Rights Act of 1990, containing strong pro-plaintiff
provisions for Title VII cases. President George H.W. Bush, a Republican, vetoed

Crowe, supra note 19, at 12.
See supra text accompanying note 49 (referring to the “sacred character of statute law”
in France).
68
28 USC. ‘1350.
69
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
70
See B. Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 “Notre Dame Law Review”
1467, 1468 n. 3 (2014) (reporting that more than 4,000 law review articles have cited the statute since
1980). The Stephens article provides a very thorough overview of this litigation experience.
71
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004) (upholding judicial power in appropriate circumstances); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (applying a presumption against
extraterritoriality to actions under the statute).
72
The decisions were Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164 (1990); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 US 642 (1990); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 US 228 (1990); Martin v. Wilks,
490 US. 755 (1990).
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the bill. The following year, Congress came back and adopted less aggressive
legislation, which President Bush signed into law.73
But as the veto of the 1990 Civil Rights Act suggests, making changes by legislation is a “sticky” and difficult process. As Professor Farhang has pointed out
in his recent analysis of American reliance on statutes that permit private enforcement of public norms, one of the reasons legislatures might favour such statutes is
that they would want to protect their legislative choices (favouring enforcement)
from the results of later elections (that might produce majorities with different
attitudes or Executive actors who have different priorities).74 Judges’ decisions
can play a very prominent role in the application of statutes. Early experiences
under the Title VII legislation, for example, made supporters of the legislation
glad they chose to authorize private enforcement because federal judges took
an expansive view of its provisions even after the election in 1968 of President
Nixon, who had a less enthusiastic attitude toward anti-discrimination efforts.75
The basic message is that the federal courts have become arbiters of statutory law
to a significant extent, and the US Supreme Court is the supreme arbiter in that
mode.
For the last 20 years, the American government has more often been in “sticky”
mode than in “fast track” mode. Unlike the UK, it has three genuine branches,
and they are genuinely independent of each other. Considering Congress and
the Legislature, divided government has been the norm more than single-party
domination. As a result, legislative stasis has also been a norm, perhaps never
more so than since 2010. Under these circumstances, it has been suggested that
the Supreme Court has even more latitude than normally for interpreting federal
statutory law in ways it finds congenial.
A prime example of that sort of activity has been judicial creation of private
rights to sue for violation of statutory or regulatory norm. Congress can surely
create a private right to sue when it wants to bolster enforcement with private
initiative. For example, in 1890 it passed the Sherman Antitrust Act,76 forbidding
contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade. This initial legislative effort had
some unfortunate flaws, so in 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act
to correct flaws in the original legislation and also add a private right permitting
those injured by antitrust violations to sue for treble damages.77
One might infer from the antitrust act experience that Congress would specify whether there should be a private right of action. But in several instances
Pub. L. No. 102–166, 1205 Stat. 1071–1100 (codified in scattered sections of 42 USC. For analysis of the legislation, see Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement,
23 “Stetson Law Review” 53 (1993).
74
See S. Farhang, The Litigation State (chp. 2) (2011).
75
See id. at 129–31.
76
15 USC. ‘1.
77
15 USC. ‘15.
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the Supreme Court took up the cudgel even though Congress did not so authorize.
The most prominent example is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and authorized it to promulgate
regulations and enforce the antifraud provisions of the Act. This Act, along with
other legislation, was designed to deal with the activities that led to the stock
market crash in 1929 and ensuing depression of the 1930s. But Congress did not
authorize private suits by those claiming injury due to violations of the Act. The
SEC promulgated rules, including Rule 10b-5 forbidding false statement in connection with the sale of a security. The lower courts began to entertain private
actions brought by those who claimed to be victims of such fraud.
In 1964, the Supreme Court endorsed the creation of a private right to sue
by the courts, reasoning that it was “a necessary supplement to [SEC] action. As
in anti-trust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the [antifraud]
requirements.”78 If one measures success by impact, this court-enabled effort
was a great success, particularly when combined with the broadened class-action
procedures introduced by amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1966. By 2006, it was said that securities fraud class actions had become “the
800-pound gorilla that dominates and overshadows other forms of class actions.”79
Many did not like this 800-pound gorilla, and claimed that it had set loose
predatory litigation in which the merits of the claims did not matter because
defendants had to settle for considerable amounts due to high litigation costs and
the risks of putting a “bet the company” case before a lay jury.80 Particularly strong
objections to securities class actions came from high tech companies in Silicon
Valley, and Congress responded in 1995 by passing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which imposed high pleading requirements and a discovery
stay on such suits. President Clinton vetoed the bill, but Congress almost immediately re-passed it over his veto. On one level, of course, this legislation confirmed
(some 30 years after the fact) that the Court had been right in implying a private
right to sue. At least Congress did not entirely forbid such private actions. Recall
that Congress can “overrule” the Court on such matters. But Congress clearly did
also want to curtail such litigation.
Nonetheless, when in 2007 the Supreme Court came to interpret the pleading
requirements of the new legislation it chose a standard the dissenting Justices
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 US 426, 432 (1964).
J. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 “Columbia Law Review” 1539, 1539 (2006).
80
See J. C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions,
43 “Stanford Law Review” 497 (1991); compare J. Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 “Harvard
Law Review” 438 (1994). For a more recent examination of related issues, see T. Baker, S. Griffith,
How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 “University of Pennsylvania Law Review” 755 (2008) (finding that “merits” issues seem to have some effect on
settlement amounts, but that the amount and provisions of directors’ insurance do also).
78
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thought too lax, beginning its opinion by citing its 1964 decision authorizing private suits and observing that “[t]his Court has long recognized that meritorious
private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively,
by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission.”81
One might object that this insistence on its own support of private suits in seeming opposition to efforts by Congress to curtail those suits is a bit of effrontery,
but it well captures the reality that the US Supreme Court considers itself to have
considerable latitude in interpreting statutes adopted by Congress to fit its mold.82

V. PROCEDURAL SUPREMACY
A very different sort of supremacy has to do with procedure. One could regard
procedure as inherently a matter for courts to develop and therefore insulated
against intrusion from other arms of government. There is some support in American scholarship for this view.83 But the historical reality was quite different for
the American federal courts. From their creation in 1789 until the 1930s, statutes
directed federal courts to apply the same procedure as state courts.84 In the early
20th century, a broad movement arose to authorize a set of nationwide procedure
rules for the federal courts. For a variety of reasons, this legislation was stymied
in Congress for a quarter century, but it was finally passed in 1934.85 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure followed in 1938. Thereafter, most states adopted procedure codes modeled on the Federal Rules.86
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 552 US 308, 313 (2007).
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court long ago adopted a more restrained attitude
toward implying private rights to sue. Indeed, Justice Scalia asserted in 2001 that the court-created securities fraud cause of action was “a relic of the heady days in which the Court assumed common-law
powers to create causes of action.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 US 61, 75 (2001)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
83
“There are spheres of activity so fundamental and so necessary to a court, so inherent in its
very nature as a court, that to divest it of its absolute command within these spheres is to make meaningless the very phrase judicial power.” A. Leo Levin, A. G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over
Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem of Constitutional Revision, 107 “University of Pennsylvania Law
Review” 1, 30 (1958); see also M. M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did not
Write Into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 “Texas Law Review” 167, 193 (1979) (arguing that judicial
supremacy extends to “rulemaking that is indispensable to courts’ functioning”).
84
See Process Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 275, 276; Conformity Act of 1872, 17 Stat 196, 197.
85
See S. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 “University of Pennsylvania Law Review” 1015 (1982).
86
See J. Oakley, A. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems
of Civil Procedure, 61 “Washington Law Review” 1367 (1986).
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This sequence is not the only one found in common law countries. In the UK,
by way of contrast, procedure had been a common law matter from time immemorial until the early 19th century. By then, objections to common law procedure
had mounted to such a pitch that the judges decided to adopt procedure rules –
the infamous Rules at Hilary Term, which were the first court-adopted procedure
rules87 and were condemned as a complete failure by Bentham and many others. An early 20th century view from the US was that “it became perfectly clear
[in England] that delegation of the control of procedural technique to the legal
profession was a policy which was socially unsound,” so that “legal procedure
was brought under public, not professional regulation.”88 In 1873–1875, Parliament passed Judiciary Acts to regulate procedure, but thereafter rules committees developed revisions. In 1994, the Lord Chancellor appointed Lord Woolf to
review and propose changes to the rules, and Lord Woolf proposed the adoption
of the Civil Procedure Act 1997, which Parliament adopted.89 That Act creates
a committee structure somewhat like the Rules Enabling Act in the US.
In the US, the Federal Rules were drafted for, and promulgated by, the US
Supreme Court. Although Congress could prevent them from going into effect, that
would require affirmative action by Congress and the signature of the President.90
In 1993, one Senator prevented passage of such legislation to alter a rule-amendment package approved by the Supreme court after the House of Representatives
had passed it and the President had indicated he would sign it.91 From the perspective of the Court, therefore, a similar form of “stickiness” might prevent changes
to the rules it adopted.
This authority over the rules of procedure can be exceptionally important,
perhaps eclipsing even the importance of state-court supremacy in matters
of common law. A prime example arose in the 1990s, when American courts
were overwhelmed by suits claiming injury due to exposure to asbestos. After
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation combined all federal-court personal
injury cases into a single proceeding before a single federal judge in Philadelphia,
a group of defendants reached a proposed settlement with a group of plaintiff
lawyers that used a “settlement class action” to substitute a claims process for
87
Roffery v. Smith, 172 Eng. Rep. 1409, 1409–10 (1834) (noting that the Rules of Hilary Term
were the first rules of court to have the force of law).
88
E. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 “Harvard Law Review” 725,
728–29 (1926).
89
For the Civil Procedure Act 1997, see: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/12/contents (last
visited 7 May 2014).
90
See 28 USC. ‘2074(a).
91
See P. Carrington, D. Aponovich, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Torts Settlements Negotiated Under Rule 23, 39 “Arizona Law Review” 461, 485
(1997) (describing how one senator’s refusal to consent to suspending the Senate’s rules prevented
passage of legislation that would have changed the amendment package adopted by the Supreme Court
in 1993).
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individual litigation and, it was hoped, reduce the very high transaction costs
associated with this form of litigation. That solution was attractive to many.
But as I noted at the time92 the class action rule did not supply the federal
courts with the authority to supplant applicable state law. As noted above,93
the Supreme Court ruled in 1938 that federal judges did not have authority to
make rules of common law, and instead had to accept and apply rules made by
state-court judges. That is why America has 51 supreme courts, not just one. Yet
federal judges reviewing settlements of class actions were substituting the very
detailed deals worked out by those who negotiated the proposed settlement.
In 199794 and 1999,95 the Supreme Court ruled that these efforts to use procedure to resolve the complications of asbestos litigation could not stand, emphasizing the limitations imposed by the Rules Enabling Act on modifying substantive
legal rights by use of procedural devices. As the Court explained, “the federal
courts – lacking authority to replace state tort systems with a national toxic tort
compensation regime – endeavoured to work with the procedural tools available
to improve management of federal asbestos litigation.”96
As the Supreme Court saw it, the class-action settlement approved by the district court was “[a]n exhaustive document exceeding 100 page, [which] presents
in detail an administrative mechanism and a schedule of payments to compensate
class members who meet defined asbestos-exposure and medical requirements.”97
But the court found that the text of the federal class-action rule “limits judicial
inventiveness” and could not be stretched to justify this arrangement.98 Concluding, the Court remarked ruefully that “[t]he argument is sensibly made that
a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most
secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure.
Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.”99 The Supreme Court would
not be as adventuresome as the district court had been, although Congress might
not have done anything had the Court permitted this use of the class-action procedure.
Other recent developments underscore the importance of procedural supremacy in dealing with mass torts, however. Although the Supreme Court stymied
broad use of class actions to resolve mass tort cases,100 the lower courts looked
elsewhere within their procedural quivers and found new procedural arrows to
See R. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 “Cornell Law
Review” 858, 872–82 (1995).
93
See supra text accompanying notes 60–61.
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Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 US 591 (1997).
95
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 US 815 (1999).
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Amchem, 521 US at 599.
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Id. at 603.
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Id. at 628–29.
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use to slay the dragon of mass tort litigation. As barriers to using class action
mounted, American lawyers and judges turned more often to the “multidistrict”
procedure authorized by federal statute.101 The most striking example is the resolution of litigation concerning the pharmaceutical product Vioxx. The US Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the claims of over 4,000 plaintiffs to
a single federal judge in New Orleans and that judge invited state court judges
from California and New Jersey to collaborate in fostering a settlement of all
the cases. Eventually, this judicial collaboration resulted in a mass settlement for
$4.85 billion. Employing what he regarded as “equitable authority” to manage
this “quasi class action,” the judge then capped the attorney fees the plaintiff lawyers could claim (even though many had contracts calling for higher fees) and
directed that some of that money should be used to pay the court-appointed lead
counsel for the plaintiffs instead of going to the lawyer who had the contract
with the given plaintiff.102 Although the “quasi class action” notion is nowhere
spelled out in a rule or statute, other judges had used the same idea.103 To date,
no appellate courts have addressed the question whether this sort of innovation is
permitted. But it stands as another example of the great authority federal courts
can manage using procedure creatively.
These efforts to make aggressive and creative use of procedure underscore
the importance of procedure, which is administered by and under the direction of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Court finds itself in the curious position
of being both a legislature and a judicial body in regard to federal rules of procedure when the interpretation of those rules is before it in a litigated case. In
the view of at least one professor who is now a federal appellate judge, this role
in rulemaking gives the Court even more latitude in interpreting rules than statutes,104 although there is dissent from this view.105 So this is another way in which
the US Supreme Court is a peculiarly supreme body.
28 USC. ‘1407. For discussion, see E. Sherman, The MDL Model For Resolving Complex Litigation If A Class Action is Not Possible, 82 “Tulane Law Review” (2008).
102
See In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 574 F.Supp.2d 606 (E.D. La. 2008).
103
See, e.g., In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174 (D. Minn., March 7, 2008); In re Zyprexa Products
Liability Litigation, 424 F.Supp.2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
104
See K. Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 44 “Hastings Law Journal” 1039, 1093 (1993): “[T]he Court’s imprimatur is placed on
the Rules; the court has an opportunity to reject whatever Rules it believes are inappropriate and to
provide further clarification, detail, or changes of any kind in the proposed Rules. Given these substantial, although largely unexercised, powers of the Court in the promulgation process, a more activist
role in the interpretative stage, one that considers purpose and policy, is appropriate. Congress has
explicitly delegated to the Court rulemaking power, and it is not inconsistent to imply the Court has
greater power to interpret Rules than it does to interpret statutes.”
105
See C. T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 “University of Pennsylvania Law Review” 1099 (2002) (arguing that the fact Congress delegated the power to promulgate rules to the Supreme Court does not give it greater latitude to interpret
those rules as it sees fit).
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The Court’s ability to control the lower courts’ handling of cases before them
provides a further avenue for it to exercise its supremacy. To take a recent and
prominent example, in the federal-court litigation challenging Proposition 8,
the California ballot measure invalidating same-sex marriage, the district judge
in San Francisco used a new local rule to arrange for the trial to be broadcast
to a number of other federal courts where people could watch it unfold. Proponents of Proposition 8, who had been allowed to “intervene” in the federal case
to defend California law, objected to broadcast of the trial, asserting that various
of their witnesses had been threatened. They objected that the local district court
had not strictly complied with the procedures for adopting local rules like the one
used to support broadcast of the trial. The Supreme Court actually took the case
on short notice, using its “supervisory authority to invalidate local rules that
were promulgated in violation of Act of Congress.”106 By a 5–4 vote, it forbade
broadcast of the trial. A network then undertook to obtain verbatim transcripts
of the trial and have actors do a reading for its audience, so the interested public
could observe a simulated version of the real trial.
In sum, the procedural authority of the US Supreme Court is too often overlooked, but it is a supreme authority that can only be changed by Congress, or
by the rules process over which the Court has the final word. And in cases like
the same-sex marriage litigation broadcast, it cannot be changed by anything.

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
It may seem odd to leave constitutional adjudication until last, but the point
of this paper is that the supremacy of the US Supreme Court depends on much
more than that. Needless to say, the US Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter
of the meaning of the US Constitution. Acting under the “case or controversy”
requirement of the Constitution, it cannot – as can constitutional courts in some
other countries – offer advance or abstract evaluations of the constitutionality
of proposed legislation. Even with legislation that has been adopted, it can act
only in the context of a concrete case brought by litigants with “standing” to raise
the issue of constitutionality.
But within those constraints, the Court is supreme. If legislation to change
the Court’s rulings is a “sticky” prospect, constitutional change is almost frozen.
In the 220+ years since the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted
in 1791, there have been only 17 more, and the last one was adopted in 1992.107
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.Ct. 705, 713 (2010).
The 27th amendment, finally ratified in 1992, was originally submitted for ratification in 1789
but ratification took over 200 years. This is not an easy process.
106
107
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Under the Supremacy Clause, the state courts must follow the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution, and are subject or reversal by the Court if they
don’t.
The lower courts are equally empowered to pass on the constitutionality
of legislation and the actions of public officers. That is part of the reason the independence and creativity of American judges noted by Professor Kagan108 is so
important. Applying the Constitution is an everyday task for judges all around
the nation. Every work day, judges all across America – in federal and state court
– are called upon to rule whether searches and seizures violate the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. Holding that legislation is unconstitutional is much
rarer, but within the authority (and duty) of every court in the land.
The Supreme Court is not required to take up constitutional issues at the behest
of other governmental actors, however. Although constitutional courts in other
countries are evidently mandated to act when presented with such questions by
other branches of government or by other courts, there is no such commandment
for the US Supreme Court presently.109 Control over its docket may be essential to
protect a supreme court against a deluge of cases,110 and it may enable the court to
accept or reject cases in a strategic manner. Part of that strategy involves a supreme
court’s recognition that its main job is rule articulation, not error correction. The
US Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is axiomatic that this Court cannot
devote itself to error correction.”111 From some perspectives, the Court may even
seem to “duck” important issues. For example, after the US District Court in San
Francisco found California Proposition 8 unconstitutional,112 the Supreme Court
ruled that the “intervenors” did not have “standing” to pursue an appeal of that
ruling, with the result that the district court ruling the California law was invalid
therefore stood,113 but the Supreme Court did not have to decide the underlying
constitutional issue.114
See supra text accompanying note 24.
Into the 20th century, the Court had some “mandatory” docket, and a small number of cases
– such as litigation between states – still qualifies. But this effect on its docket is minuscule, and does
not raise matters of constitutional import as discussed in text.
110
See M. C. Dorf, Abstract and Concrete Review, (in:) V. Amar, M. Tushnet (eds.), Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (2009), at 1, 13 (“In Germany, where anyone can, in principle, bring
a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court, the success rate of such complaints is 2.5 percent, and the Court has accordingly adopted screening procedures to deny full consideration to most
complaints.”).
111
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 US 538, 569 (1998).
112
See supra text accompanying note 106, for discussion of the Supreme Court’s order that the trial of the case not be broadcast.
113
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013).
114
But in the companion case, United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), the Court found
that litigants in a similar situation to the proponents of Proposition 8 did have standing to litigate
whether a federal statute entitled the Defense of Marriage Act was constitutional, and the court ruled
that it was not. Since then, there have been many decisions in lower courts invalidating other legisla108
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Indeed, it has been argued that the Supreme Court’s ability to defer decision actually contributes to its decision-making. Thus, when it was proposed
in the 1970s and 1980s that a new National Court of Appeals be created to resolve
conflicting decisions among the federal appellate courts, one argument was that
allowing the lower courts to explore divergent interpretations of the law will
ultimately assist the Court because those decisions will fully air issues before
the Court has to decide them.115 In 1983, for example, Justice Stevens issued
an opinion in regard to the Court’s denial of certiorari in case, explaining that
“I believe that further consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications of the problem by other courts will enable us to deal with the issue
more wisely at a later date.”116 The new court of appeals was also opposed on
the ground that it would undermine the Supreme Court’s sense of responsibility.117
That responsibility results from and reaffirms the Court’s supremacy; interpreting the Constitution is the most important aspect of that supremacy, but hardly
the only one.

VII. CONCLUSION – DECIDING WHICH SYSTEM IS BEST
No one system is “best” for all countries. The system that is best for a given
nation is dependent on too many variables to support such a sweeping conclusion.
Although it may be that the specialized constitutional courts recently introduced
in a number of civil law countries succeed or fail as much due to their design
as to “political culture,”118 the US experience suggests otherwise. The technical arrangements for the US Supreme Court were set out in the Constitution
in 1789, and have remained relatively constant since then.119 As Professor Crowe
has shown, however, the prominence of the US Supreme Court has increased
enormously since the 18th century.120 Other scholars have recently suggested that
tion based on the decision in the Windsor case. See E. Eckholm, Wave of Appeals Expected to Turn
the Tide on Same-Sex Marriage Bans, “New York Times”, March 23, 2014, at 18.
115
See A. Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity: Does the Supreme court Need
Help?, 67 “Judicature” 28, 37 (1983) (referring to conflicts among the lower courts as “the judicial
system’s analogue to the adversary process”).
116
McCray v. New York, 461 US 961, 961 (1983).
117
See W. Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 “University of Chicago
Law Review” 473, 480–85 (1973).
118
See supra text accompanying note 17.
119
True, Congress has changed the number of justices on occasion. On one occasion – the notorious “court-packing scheme” of President Franklin Roosevelt in 1937 – an effort to do that to achieve
short-term political advantage backfired. And the country has grown hugely since the 18th century,
both in land mass and population. But the basic arrangements are not really significantly different.
120
See Crowe, supra note 19.
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“[t] ere is a sense in which constitutions and the courts may seem to mature like
a fine claret.”121 The American experience partly supports that view. The supreme
or constitutional courts established in many countries in the late 20th century can
hardly have hit maturity in two decades compared to the American Court, which
was founded in the 18th century and developed gradually over the ensuing two
centuries.
As we have seen, the supremacy of the US Supreme Court (and perhaps
a number of other supreme courts in common law systems) can depend on many
attributes. Arguably, the most important is the latitude afforded judges in common law systems to “make law,” which stands in stark contrast to the supposed
narrowness of the judicial function in many civil law countries.122 In a related
sense, the supremacy the courts have in interpreting statutes stands as something
as a counterweight to the legislature’s power to enact them (and to change judicial
outcomes by further enactment).123 And in the US, the authority of the judiciary over procedure can matter at least as much as its supremacy on other matters.124 So although the supreme court’s supremacy in regard to the meaning
of the constitution is surely extremely important,125 it is only one among a variety
of supremacies our Supreme Court exhibits. As a very prominent American judge
recently put it, “it is fair to ask whether the leading change agent in American
society in some years has been the Supreme Court.”126 That probably can’t be said
of many other countries.
Even though it is not possible to proclaim any system “best,” it is very useful to appreciate the consequences of features of any system that those within it
may take for granted. That is a prime value of comparative studies, like the ones
on display in this conference. The starting point is, as the organizers foretold,
the common law/civil law distinction. But that starting point is mainly important with regard to the judicial “law making” permitted in common law systems,
which can make supreme courts nearly as supreme with regard to a range of legal
issues as they are with respect to constitutional interpretation. Whether this is
good or bad, I leave to others with the hope that this introduction has identified at
least some of the issues.

121
A. Harding, P. Leyland, T. Groppi, Constitutional Courts: Forms, Functions and Practice
in Comparative Perspective, (in:) Harding & Leyland, supra note 4, at 1, 25.
122
See Part III.
123
See Part IV.
124
See Part V.
125
See Part VI.
126
J. S. Sutton, Courts As Change Agents: Do We Want More or Less?, 127 “Harvard Law Review” 1419, 1421 (2014).
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A COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUPREME COURT
AND ITS FUNCTIONS

Summary
The text presents different attributes of the Supreme Court in common law and civil
law systems. The author claims that the question of design and function of a supreme
court, while important, is no more significant than the issue of its institutional status and
evolution, i.e. something one could refer to as “legal culture”. Neither the “common law
camp”, nor the “civil law camp” turns out to be monolithic in this regard.
The distinctive history of the US Supreme Court is presented through the perspective
of its statutory and procedural supremacy, as well as its power of constitutional
adjudication. The author indicates that the supremacy of the US Supreme Court depends
on many factors. Arguably, the most important attribute of the US Supreme Court’s
supremacy is linked with the latitude offered to judges in common law system to “make
law”, which stands in contrast to a limited judicial function in many civil law countries.
The author argues that being a court in a common law system carries with it much broader
authority. A supreme court in such a system is, as a result, much more supreme.
The author concludes his comparative remarks by saying that it is not possible to
proclaim the superiority of one specific system because there are too many variables that
come into play with regard to respective nations.
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